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Abstract
The transparency and openness of the monetary policymaking
process at the Bank of England has provided very detailed information
on both the decisions of individual members of the Monetary Policy
Committee and the information on which they are based. In this pa-
per we consider this decision making process in the context of a model
in which inflation forecast targeting is used but there is heterogeneity
among the members of the committee. We find that internally gener-
ated forecasts of output and market generated expectations of medium
term inflation provide the best description of discrete changes in in-
terest rates. We also find a role for asset prices through the equity
market, foreign exchange market and housing prices. There are also
identifiable forms of heterogeneity among members of the committee
that improves the predictability of interest rate changes. This can
be thought of as supporting the argument that full transparency of
monetary policy decision making can be welfare enhancing.
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1 Introduction1
There is a substantial literature in the US that uses information from tran-
scripts of the proceedings of the FOMC to study the monetary policymaking
process. See for example Belden (1989), Havrilesky and Gildea (1991), Edi-
son and Marquez (1998) and Chappell et al. (2004). This has provided a
number of insights into how committees work and the role played by indi-
vidual members, especially the Chairman. This body of work has helped to
strip away the traditional mystic of monetary policy, and has been followed
much more recently by studies of the monetary policymaking process of the
Bank of England. In 1992, the United Kingdom, following New Zealand and
Sweden, adopted inflation targeting. This was augmented by a much more
open system of decision-making, but ultimately decisions on interest rates
were still made by the Government. In 1997 the Bank of England was given
full operational independence. To support this new policy regime, very de-
tailed information about interest rate decisions has been provided. Recent
literature has used such detailed information, including votes by individual
members of the Monetary Policy Committee, to study several aspects of
monetary policymaking at the Bank of England2.
In this paper we consider this decision making process in the context of a
model in which inflation forecast targeting is used but there is heterogeneity
among the members of the Committee. This heterogeneity does not arise
so much from differences in preferences about inflation and output, as from
differences in information assimilation.
Our paper touches on a number of issues connected to monetary pol-
icy. There is a large literature that examines the usefulness of characterising
monetary policy in terms of a rule. More recently, Orphanides (2003) has
provided a historical analysis and has been able to show that there is a de-
gree of consistency in the conduct of US monetary policy during the 1920s
and since the 1951 accord, that gave effective independence to the Federal
Reserve. This involves the use of simple monetary rules such as those advo-
cated by Taylor (1993). Simple rules have a number of advantages chiefly,
1We are grateful to Stephanie Daniel for research assistance. The paper has benefited
from comments by Jagjit Chadha, David Cobham, Andrew Hughes Hallett, Marcus Miller
and Charles Nolan, as well as participants at the MMF Conference, the ECB and European
University Institute. Remaining errors are the responsibility of the authors.
2See, for example, Chadha and Nolan (2001), Cobham (2002a, b, 2003) and Gerlach-
Kristen (2004).
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perhaps, by making the operation of monetary policy transparent and there-
fore easily monitored by the private sector. The question remains as to what
form such a simple rule should take. Taylor (1993) conditions short term
interest rates on current deviations of output and inflation from target while
Svensson (1997a, b) argues that, given the long and variable lags inherent
in policy, it might make more sense to target a forecast of inflation rather
than its current value. Orphanides (1998) has also pointed out that decisions
about interest rates are made in real time and based on current information,
and that there is often considerable uncertainty about the current state of
the economy. In this paper we assume that the filtering which is required
of current, imperfect measures of economic activity takes place as part of
the internal procedures of the Bank of England (see Budd (1998) for a de-
scription). Our empirical results suggest that a rule, whereby interest rates
respond to forecasts of inflation and output, provides the best explanation
of UK monetary policy since 1997. This confirms what has been emphasised
repeatedly by a number of commentators, that the Bank operates an inflation
forecast type of rule, but we also find some evidence that developments in
asset markets matter. There is now an extensive literature on the role that
asset market developments should play in monetary policy decisions. For
example, Bernanke and Gertler (2001) argue that policy should not respond
to changes in assets prices, except in so far as they signal changes in expected
inflation. Cecchetti et al. (2000), by contrast, have argued that monetary
policy should respond to bubbles or misalignments in asset prices3.
Our ability to detect some role for asset market developments in part
depends on a significant degree of heterogeneity across the Monetary Policy
Committee. Because we know the precise voting record of each member of the
MPC we can increase the degrees of freedom we have by modelling both the
collective interest rate decision that is actually implemented, and the interest
rate settings that each member voted for. This brings us to the question
why there is heterogeneity across the Committee in the first place given that
they all share a common pool of information, there is considerable discussion
among the members of the Committee prior to an interest rate decision being
made and individual members have many opportunities to make their views
known. One possibility is to assume that preferences concerning output and
inflation vary between members (Neumann, 2002; Sibert, 2003). Here we
3For other views see Vickers (1999), Goodhart (2001), Bullard and Schalling (2002),
Cobham (2002a) and Bean (2003).
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assume that the heterogeneity reflects differing views of the world, with some
members attaching greater importance to particular developments in the
economy such as the housing market or equity prices than others. Some other
individual members may also differ in their view on the size of the output gap
because they attach greater importance to developments on the supply side.
Equally, some members may disagree with the majority view because they
believe the transmission mechanism of monetary policy is different4. We
seek to model this process as a signal extraction problem, with individual
members optimally combining the forecast of the majority with their own
views.
There is a long-standing debate in policy and academic circles about the
role openness and transparency should play in policymaking. The contrast
between the degree of transparency that the Bank of England aspires to and
the traditional practices of Central Bankers could not be greater5.
Transparency serves the need of accountability but it also improves pre-
dictability. We find that knowing the voting records of committee members
improves our ability to predict interest rates compared to when only the ag-
gregate decision is known. The heterogeneity across the MPC is valuable in-
formation. This throws some light on the current debate about the extent to
which central banks should make decision making processes as transparent as
possible6. In this sense our empirical results would suggest that transparency
is desirable.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we discuss briefly some
simple models of the inflation process and introduce a role for transparency
and for a committee structure for decision-making and consider the signal
extraction problem that the MPC and its members face individually. In
Section 3 we discuss the estimation problem. In section 4 we report our
empirical results. Finally, in section 5, we present our conclusions.
4See, for example, Belden’s (1989) analysis of dissents in FOMC votes and Chadha and
Nolan’s (2001) analysis in the UK context. Other measures of uncertainty discussed in the
literature include forecast revisions (Chadha and Nolan, 2001) and dispersion in survey
correspondents’ views on inflation (Bomberger, 1996).
5See Chadha and Nolan (2001) for an early analysis of the post-1997 policy regime.
6See Geraats (2002) for an extensive survey of the question of transparency in monetary
policymaking, and Gerlach-Kristen (2004) for a recent empirical analysis of predictability
in MPC decision-making.
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2 Models of the inflation process
We adopt the most simple form of a model of the monetary policymaking
process and abstract from many issues that have been the focus of much of
the recent literature. We do this deliberately in order to have a model that
appears to allign best with how central banks view the monetary transmission
process and to provide a justification for the way in which policy appears to
be conducted.7. The model is structured as follows:
πt = πt−1 + αyt−1 + ǫt (1)
yt = β1yt−1 − β2(it−1 − πt−1) + ηt (2)
πt is the inflation rate in period t, yt is the output gap (the difference
between the log of output and the log of potential output), it is the nominal
interest rate. ηt and εt are iid shocks in period t not observable in period
t − 1. The coefficients α and β2 are positive; β1 (0 < β1 < 1) measures the
degree of persistence in the output gap. The output gap depends negatively
on the real lagged interest rate. The change in inflation depends on the
lagged output gap. The output gap is normalised to zero in the long run.
These pure delays in the impact of the output gap on inflation and of
interest rates on the output gap captures in the most straightforward way
the central bankers’ stylised model of the monetary transmission process.
The modern generation of New Keynesian models with nominal inertia and
imperfect competition still exhibit jumps in output and inflation in response
to shocks8 which will blur the pure delays embodied in equations (1) and (2).
The intertemporal loss function is:
Lt =
1
2
Et
∞∑
τ=t
[
δτ−t
[
(πτ − π
∗)2
]
+ λy2τ
]
. (3)
Here, Et denotes expectations conditional on information available in period
t. π∗ is the inflation target, and δ is the discount rate (0 < δ < 1). The
policymaker minimises the present discounted value of squared deviations of
inflation from its target and the output gap. λ is the weight the policymaker
attaches to the output gap, with the weight on inflation normalised to unity.
7In particular, for expositional purposes we ignore forward-looking expectations and
issues arising consequently from time inconsistency.
8See Corrado and Holly (2004) for an example in which inertia comes partly from habit
persistence in household consumption.
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For the special case of λ = 0, so the policymaker only targets inflation,
the central bank can (in expectation) use the current interest rate to hit the
target for inflation two periods hence. So perfect controllability allows the
intertemporal problem to be written as a sequence of single period problems.
In this case (Svensson, 1997a):
Lt =
1
2
[
πt+2|t − π
∗
]2
, (4)
where πt+2|t is the forecast of inflation at time period t+2 based on informa-
tion available in period t. The central bank minimises the squared deviation
of the current two-year inflation forecast, πt+2|t, from the target. The forecast
of πt+2 at t is
πt+2|t = πt+1|t + αyt+1|t (5)
and
yt+1|t = β1yt|t − β2(it − πt|t), (6)
where the subscript t|t indicates that current realisations of the output gap
and inflation may well be imperfectly observed, and need to be forecasted.
So:
πt+2|t = α
[
β1yt|t − β2(it − πt|t)
]
. (7)
Then the inflation ‘feed forward’ rule is
it = (πt|t − π
∗) +
1
αβ2
πt+1|t +
β1
β2
yt|t. (8)
This satisfies the Taylor Principle since ∂i/∂π > 1, as long as there is
persistence in inflation. Although an explicit weight is not attached to out-
put losses, current (forecasted) output appears in the rule because the cur-
rent output gap is informative about future inflation. In Svensson’s original
formulation πt|t and yt|t are known. In practice, as Orphanides (1998) has
pointed out, in real time current inflation and the current output gap are
not observed. For expositional purposes we are assuming that the decision
period coincides with the observation period. In practice data are available
at different frequencies from daily to yearly9.
9It is straight forward to cast this problem of optimally combining data of different
frequencies as a filtering problem. See for example, Corrado and Green (1988).
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2.1 Committee decision-making
In contrast to the Federal Reserve10 and the ECB, where decision making
is by ‘consensus’, the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England
uses majority voting so it is the median vote that decides the outcome for
monetary policy. One way to model decision making by committee is to
assume that preferences with respect to inflation and output vary across the
committee (Neuman, 2002; Sibert, 2003). In this case we can write a loss
function for the jth committee member as:
Ljt =
1
2
Et
∑
τ=t
δτ−t
[
(πt − π
∗)2
]
+ λjy
2
t , for j = 1, ...,m. (9)
If we confine ourselves to the case considered earlier when only inflation
matters, preference heterogeneity is not meaningful. Instead we adopt the
alternative approach in which heterogeneity arises from differing views about
the state of the economy11. Each member has the same (public) information
set but will augment this with private information. This can take different
forms. An individual member may dissent from the consensus forecast or an
individual member may have particular expertise that leads to more weight
being attached to particular kinds of information compared to the average.
Since the internal dynamics of committee decision making can result in a
measure of sharing of expertise (see Geanakoplos, 1992; Bicchieri, 1993),
we shall assume that the decision of each individual member is ultimately
based on commonly shared information as well as private views that cannot
be shared fully with the other members of the MPC, or to which the other
members of the Committee do not attach importance.
We can also model this process in the following way. There is a grow-
ing game theoretic literature on committee decision making involving issues
such as strategic voting, the acquisition of information, possible conflicts of
interest, and how information is communicated in committees (see Gerling
10See Edison and Marquez (1998) for a detailed description of the decision making
processes of the Federal Open Markets Committee.
11As King (2002) has pointed out, most of the discussion that takes place among the
MPC members is focused on a technical economic judgment about what it is necessary
to do to hit the inflation target. A sense of this process can be got from the summary of
discussions in each MPC meeting discussed in Cobham (2003). Chadha and Nolan (2001)
examine whether the perceived variation in preferences across MPC members (as revealed
in their votes) is related to volatility in interest rates.
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et al. (2003) for a recent survey). Following this literature, we can think of
the decision-making process by the MPC as a two-stage process. In this first
stage there is deliberation about the state of the economy (Gerlach-Kristen,
2003; Meade and Stasavage, 2004), staff economists present conjunctural
analyses of recent events, members share information and views and eventu-
ally a central forecast, with agreed error bands in the form of a fan chart, is
arrived at. Nevertheless, at the second stage, despite this sharing of knowl-
edge many MPC members will choose an interest setting different to the
central estimate.
This process can be cast as a simple signal extraction problem. Sup-
pose there is an estimate of the output gap ybt , which is agreed upon after
deliberation. This is an unbiased estimate of the true output gap with12
ybt = yt + ω
b
t with ω
b
t ∽ N(0, σ
2
ωb). (10)
Each committee member in turn formulates her own (unbiased) estimate
of the output gap as:
yjt = yt + ω
j
t with ω
j
t ∽ N(0, σ
2
ωj), for j = 1, ..m (11)
Crucially this estimate reflects private views not shared by the rest of the
committee so E(ωjtω
k
t ) = 0, for j = k. The jth variance term σ
2
ωj captures
both objective and subjective confidence in the estimate of yt’s.
Let xj be a g× 1 vector of possible variables that the j-th MPC member
may take notice of (including private information contained in asset and
labour market developments, for example). Then the underlying model is
yjt = βx
j
t + ω
j
t (12)
It may be the case that new members take some time to find their feet
and at the early meetings vote with the sense of the meeting, only dissenting
once an understanding of the process has been built up. In this instance
there will be a very diffuse prior on the estimate of the output gap. For the
j-th member the estimate of yt that minimises the forecast error variance
and combines optimally the bank forecast and the private forecast is given
by:
ydjt = y
b
t + κ
j(yjt − y
b
t ), (13)
12Strictly speaking, the fan charts that the Bank produces allow for possible asymme-
try,and hence the errors may not be normally distributed. We assume normality for the
sake of simplicity.
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where ydjt is the final decision by the j-th member on what the best estimate
of the output gap is. The Kalman gain, κj, is:
κj =
σ2ωb
σ2
ωb
+ σ2
ωj
(14)
Clearly the more confident the committee member is in her own judge-
ment the smaller σ2ωj , and the less weight is attached to the collective forecast.
We then have the forecast error variance for the combined estimate of yt as:
σ2ydj =
σ2ωbσ
2
ωj
σ2
ωb
+ σ2
ωj
(15)
The decision rule for the jth member can now be written as:
ijt = (πt|t − π
∗) +
1
αβ2
πt+1|t +
β1
β2
yt|t + ςjt for j = 1, ...,m, (16)
where ςjt need not be a zero mean process and captures the extent to which
the j-th member deviates from the central interest rate projection that is
implied by the central bank forecast. The decision that is actually imple-
mented, ∆it, is then a multiple of 25 basis points, and is the vote of the
median member13.
There are two main forms of heterogeneity in this model. First, members
may differ, for example, about the size of the output gap. Some members
may believe that the central estimate of the output gap generated by the
staff of the Bank of England underestimates improvements on the supply
side that widens the output gap and places less pressure on inflation. In
these circumstances a member may prefer on average a lower interest rate.
This we capture by the fixed effect, ςjt, that (in absolute value) is increasing
in the forecast standard deviation of the output gap. However, we assume
that there are zero covariances among the ςjt. In other words, this assumes
that the common information set across all members of the MPC spans the
common information between any pair of members, though not necessarily
the private information of each MPC member.
13Strictly the voting is sequential, where the initial options are to raise, lower or the
keep the interest rate unchanged. If a majority votes for no change there is no further
voting. If the vote is for a change, either higher or lower, a vote is then needed on the
magnitude of the change.
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Secondly, views may differ about the effect of interest rates on output and
inflation. Suppose, for example, a member of the Committee believes that the
effect of interest rates on the output gap captured by β2, is actually smaller
than the central estimate. In this case interest rate setting will need to be
more variable in response to shocks to output and inflation. This member will
vote for more changes in interest rates, both positive and negative, compared
to the average. We interpret this as the actions of an activist member14.
This can be seen if we write an expression for the volatility of interest
rates implied by equation (8) for given unconditional variances for output
and inflation as:
σ2i = (1 +
1
α2β22
)σ2π + (
β1
β2
)2σ2y, (17)
where σ2i is the variance of the nominal interest rate, σ
2
π the variance of
inflation and σ2y the variance of output. Clearly for given variances of output
and inflation, a fall in the slope of the IS curve raises the volatility of interest
rates. The term on the variance of inflation, which is greater than one, can
be thought of the volatility equivalance of the Taylor principle.
2.2 Recursive Information Processing
In the previous section the signal extraction problem was cast as one in
which individual members decide on their interest rate recommendation by
combining optimally the common and the private forecast. But it is also
worthwhile to think of the process by which the signal is extracted as re-
cursive. In particular, the MPC meets and makes decisions on a monthly
basis. New information is analysed relative to what was known in the pre-
vious month. This is because in each month the MPC explicitly sets the
interest rate at that level which it believes will achieve the inflation target 18
months to two years into the future. It must therefore be the case that if no
new (reliable) information is available about the state of the economy then
14In the empirical analysis presented later in the paper, we segregate these two sources of
heterogeneity from one another. The first source of heterogeneity is related to uncertainty
about forecasts of the output gap, which can be measured from the fan charts of output
growth published by the Bank of England. The second source of heterogeneity is related
to the level of activism of a particular member, and can be identified from the residuals
of a regression model in which the first source of heterogeneity has been controlled for.
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interest rates will remain unchanged15. Moreover, given that interest rates
are only changed in multiples of 25 basis points, there has to be sufficient
new information to trigger a change.
The problem of determining yt|t and πt+1|t and implicitly the uncertainty
associated with forecasts, can also be cast as an optimal filtering or signal
extraction problem (Holly and Hughes Hallett, 1989). Define the state vector
y˜t = (πt, yt)
′. So that,
y˜t = Ay˜t−1 +But + et, (18)
where y˜t is a 2× 1 vector, A a 2× 2 matrix, B is 2× 1 vector and ut = it. et
is a 2× 1 vector of iid shocks. We assume that we observe the current state
of the economy imperfectly so
zt = Hy˜t + ψt, (19)
where E(ψt) = 0 and E(ψ
′
tψt) = Γt and zt is a 2×1 vector of observations of
the state vector. We want the best estimate of y˜t conditional on information
available, which is y˜t|t.
Prior knowledge of the conditional density of y˜t−1 based on the informa-
tion set Ωt gives
E(y˜t−1 | Ωt) = y˜t−1|t (20)
and
E(y˜t | Ωt) = Ay˜t−1|t +But. (21)
The conditional covariance of y˜t−1|t is defined as
Cov(y˜t−1 | Ωt) = Λt−1, (22)
so
Cov(y˜t | Ωt) = AΛt−1A
′ + Γt = Λt (23)
15Recently there has been a controversy in the literature about the use of what can
be called constant interest rate forecasts (see Leitemo, 2003, and Honkapohja and Mitra,
2004). As Goodhart has put it: “When I was a member of the MPC I thought that I was
trying, at each forecast round, to set the level of interest rates so that, without the need
for future rate changes, prospective (forecast) inflation would on average equal the target
at the policy horizon”. In the context of the model of this paper where it takes two years
for interest rates to impact on inflation, the constant interest setting is optimal. However,
in New Keynesian models with forward looking expectations, it may not be.
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In this framework the time varying quality and reliability of information
is captured by Γt. The solution to this problem provides a way of optimally
updating estimates of y˜t.
y˜t|t = y˜t|t−1 + Ft(zt −Hy˜t|t−1) (24)
where Ft = ΛtH
′(HΛtH
′ + Γt)
−1. Thus, the best estimate is a linear com-
bination of the previous best estimate and a correction for the difference
between the previous estimate and the latest observations.
The central point from the perspective of monetary control is that the
usefulness of new observations on the economy varies over time. In some
periods with a large Γt, there will be little if any revisions to the optimal
estimate of y˜t|t, so a change in the interest rate setting will not take place
16.
Information about the state of the economy appears more or less continuously
if we are observing asset markets while other forms of information appear as
discrete packages in the form of flash estimates of GDP, full sets of national
accounts and regularly compiled forecasts.
We assume that this multivariate filtering is the domain of the Bank of
England and the MPC. However, we can also allow for individual members
of the MPC to optimally update their private forecasts. Assume that ςjt for
each member follows an autoregressive process.
ςjt = φj + θjςjt−1 + γjt, 0 < θj < 1, γjt ∽ N(0, σ
2
γt
) (25)
and we observe this via
zjt = ςjt + δjt with δjt ∽ N(0, σ
2
δjt
), (26)
where now z is a scalar. Then the optimal private estimate for the j-th
committee member is
ςjt|t = ςjt|t−1 + [σ
2
γjt
/(σ2γjt + σ
2
δjt
)(zjt − ςjt|t−1)] (27)
As earlier, the revisions to private information will vary with the quality
of new observations.
16It may also be that interest rate setting by the MPC is affected by the frequency with
which the central forecasts of the Bank of England are updated. The Inflation Report is
published 4 times a year in February, May, August and November.
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The standard separation of observation from control means that these
optimal estimates of y˜t|t and ς it|t can be plugged into the feedback rule given
in equation (16)17. Note, however, that whereas the form of the feedback rule
is independent of the observation process, the actual interest rate decision is
not. This will be affected by the quality and reliability of the information
that flows into the monetary decision making process.
3 Data and Econometric models
3.1 The information set and measurement of variables
In this section we turn to an empirical examination of monetary policy in the
UK. In the previous section the model suggested that an inflation forecast
rule has been used and we attempt to test for this using information provided
regularly by the Bank of England in the Inflation Report. We collected
information on the kinds of data that the MPC looked at for each monthly
meeting. Not all of this information is made use of in this paper but the
important issue was to ensure that we conditioned only on what information
was actually available at the time of each meeting.
Our dependent variable is the change in base rate agreed by the MPC at
each of its meetings, from June 1997 to December 2003; these meetings are
monthly and held in the first week of each month, except September 2001
when an additional meeting was held following the events on September 11.
Our study of heterogeneity among the members of the MPC is based on deci-
sions of the individual members. The source for these data are the minutes of
the MPC meetings. We evaluate our models using data on monthly meetings
in 2004 and the first quarter of 2005.
Assessing monetary policy decisions in the presence of uncertainty about
forecast levels of inflation and the output gap (including uncertainty both
in forecast output levels and perception about potential output) requires
collection of real-time data available to the policymakers when interest rate
decisions are made as well as measures of forecast uncertainty. This contrasts
with many studies of monetary policy which are based on realised (and subse-
quently revised) measures of economic activity (see Orphanides, 2003). The
extent to which there is uncertainty about the forecast of the Bank of Eng-
17This separation also carries over to a more general model in which expectations are
forward looking (Pearlman, 1992).
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land can be inferred from the fan charts published in the Inflation Report
(Britton et al., 1998).
We also collected information on unemployment (where this typically
refers to unemployment three months prior to the MPC meeting, as well
data on the underlying state of asset markets (housing prices, share prices
and exchange rates). We measure unemployment by the year-on-year change
in International Labor Organization (ILO) rate of unemployment, lagged
3 months. The ILO rate of unemployment is computed using 3 months
rolling average estimates of the number of ILO-unemployed persons and size
of labour force (ILO definition), both collected from the Office of National
Statistics (ONS) Labour Force Survey. Housing prices are measured by the
year-on-year growth rates of the Nationwide housing prices index (seasonally
adjusted) for the previous month (Source: Nationwide). Share prices and
exchange rates are measured by the year-on-year growth rate of the FTSE
100 share index and the effective exchange rate respectively at the end of the
previous month (Source: Bank of England). The other current information
included in the model is the current level of inflation; this is measured by the
year-on-year growth rate of RPIX headline inflation lagged 2 months (Source:
ONS).
Our model also includes expected rates of future inflation and forecasts of
current and future output. One difficulty with using the Bank’s forecasts of
inflation is that they are not sufficiently informative. By definition, the Bank
targets inflation over a two year horizon, so it always publishes a forecast
in which (in expectation) inflation hits the target in two years time. To do
anything else would be internally inconsistent. Instead, as a measure of future
inflation, we use the 4 year ahead inflation expectations implicit in bond
markets at the time of the MPC meeting, data on which can be inferred from
the Bank of England’s forward yield curve estimates obtained from index
linked bonds18. For current output, we use annual growth of 2-month-lagged
monthly GDP published by the National Institute of Economic and Social
Research (NIESR) and for one-year-ahead forecast GDP growth, we use the
Bank of England’s model based mean quarterly forecasts. As a measure
of forecast uncertainty, we use the standard deviation of the one-year-ahead
forecast. These measures are obtained from the Bank of England’s fan charts
18We use the four year expected inflation figure because the two year figure is not
available for the full sample. In practice the inflation yield curve tends to be very flat
after two years.
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Figure 1: Variation in forecast output growth and its variance over time
of output; details regarding these measures are discussed elsewhere (Britton
et al., 1998). The forecasts of one-year-ahead output growth and its variance
show substantial variation over time (Figure 1).
3.2 An interval censoring model of base rate changes
Interest rate changes are highly clustered, with a majority of the meetings
proposing no change in the base rate (see Figure 2). For the Bank of England
MPC over the period of our analysis (June 1997 to March 2005), 69 per cent
of the meetings decided to keep the base rate at its current level, 14 per cent
recommended a rise of 25 basis points, 13 per cent recommended a reduction
of 25 basis points, and 4 per cent a reduction of 0.50 per cent. This clustering
has to be taken into account when studying decisions of the MPC. We do
not observe changes in interest rates on a continuous or unrestricted scale,
we have a non-continuous or limited dependent variable. Moreover, changes
in interest rates are in multiples of 25 basis points. So, in this paper, we use
an interval regression framework for analysis; other authors have used other
limited dependent variable frameworks, like the logit/ probit or multinomial
logit/ probit framework (for recent contributions, see Chevapatrakul et al.,
2001, and Gascoigne and Turner, 2003). Our choice of model is based on
the need to use all the information that is available when monetary policy
decisions are made, as well as problems relating to model specification and
interpretation of multinomial logit models (Greene, 1993). We also explored
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Figure 2: Discrete (Limited Dependent) nature of interest rate changes
a multinomial logit formulation, and found the broad empirical conclusions
to be similar.
The interval regression model (Amemiya, 1973) is a generalisation of the
tobit model where the truncation in the dependent variable is possibly dif-
ferent for different observation units, and the truncation cut-offs are known.
The observed dependent variable in our case,△rt,obs, is the truncated version
of the latent monetary policy response variable, △rt, which we model as
△rt,obs = −0.5 if △rt ∈ (−∞,−0.375)
= −0.25 if △rt ∈ [−0.375,−0.20)
= 0 if △rt ∈ [−0.20, 0.20]
= 0.25 if △rt ∈ (0.20, 0.375]
= 0.5 if △rt ∈ (0.375,∞)
The wider truncation interval when interest rates are unchanged (ie., for
△rt,obs = 0) may be interpreted as reflecting the conservative stance of mon-
etary policy under uncertainty with a bias in favour of leaving interest rates
unchanged.
Under this observation scheme, we estimate the following model of MPC
inflation targeting:
△rt = α+ βr.△rt−1,obs + βπ0.πt + βπ4.πt+4|t + βy0.yt|t (28)
+βy1.yt+1|t + βσ.σ
(
yt+1|t
)
+ λ/.Zt−1 + εt,
where Zt−1 represents current observations on unemployment (△ut) and the
underlying state of asset markets: housing, equity and the foreign exchange
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market (Phsg,t, PFTSE,t and Pexch,t respectively). Standard deviation of the
one-year ahead forecast of output growth is denoted by σ
(
yt+1|t
)
; this term
is included to incorporate the notion that the stance of monetary policy may
depend on the uncertainty relating to forecast future levels of output and
inflation. As was shown in the previous section, increased uncertainty about
the current state of the economy will tend to bias policy towards caution in
changing interest rates. In particular, this strand of the literature suggests
that optimal monetary policy may be more cautious (rather than activist)
under greater uncertainty in the forecast or real-time estimates of output gap
and inflation (see Issing, 2002; Aoki, 2003; and Orphanides, 2003). Since, as
previously discussed, the published inflation forecast is not sufficiently infor-
mative, we confined ourselves to uncertainty relating to forecasts of future
output growth.
3.3 Fixed effects model of base rate changes with het-
erogeneity among members
Each member of the MPC arrives at her own decision regarding interest rates,
and committee interest rate decisions are arrived at by voting on these indi-
vidual proposals. In addition to the majority decision, the Bank of England
also publishes what each member of the committee wished to do. The voting
pattern of individual members of the MPC suggests substantial systematic
differences across the committee (Table 1)19. These data on individual votes
offers the opportunity to examine the voting pattern in MPC meetings, and
the resulting majority decision.
In the model of section 2 we have suggested that uncertainty about fore-
casts will affect monetary policy decisions. Moreover, that there will be
heterogeneity in the way individual members incorporate this uncertainty
19For example, of the 37 meetings which Allsopp attended, the votes for 11 were against
the consensus decision, and all of these were for a lower interest rate. Similarly, Julius
voted against the consensus motion in 14 of the 45 meetings; all of these in favour of a
lower interest rate. Wadhwani disagreed 13 out of 37 times, each time in favour of a lower
interest rate. On the other hand, King disagreed with the consensus decision in 12 of
the 82 meetings he attended, voting for a higher interest rate each time. Buiter dissented
in 17 meetings out of 36, voting on 8 occasions for a lower interest rate and 9 times in
favour of a higher one. Nickell favoured a different interest rate decision in 10 of the 49
meetings; 6 for a lower interest rate and 4 for a higher interest rate. See also King (2002)
and Gerlach-Kristen (2004).
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about future levels of output (or different notions about full employment
level of future output) into their decisions. This appears to justify a model
of individual MPC members’ decisions, where there may be heterogeneity in
the effect, βσ, that σ
(
yt+1|t
)
has on the interest rate decisions.
TABLE 1: Heterogeneity among members:
Voting records of selected MPC members (Jun. 1997 to Dec. 2003)
Member Meetings Votes Dissent
Lower No change Raise Total High Low
Allsopp 37 18 19 0 11 0 11
Barker 37 9 24 4 4 1 3
Bean 45 10 32 3 1 0 1
Buiter 36 10 10 16 17 9 8
George 74 15 51 8 0 0 0
Goodhart 36 7 18 11 3 3 0
Julius 45 18 25 2 14 0 14
King 85 14 50 21 12 12 0
Nickell 49 15 27 7 10 4 6
Wadhwani 37 16 18 3 13 0 13
However, a simple analysis of the voting records of individual members
does not necessarily on its own establish whether a member is a hawk or a
dove and/or an activist. Most external members serve for three years and
it is possible that their term of office coincides with a period, when because
of the position of the business cycle, interest rates are rising or falling. We
need to condition the analysis of heterogeneity on the state of the economy.
Under a similar interval regression framework as above, we would then have
the model:
△rit = α+ βr.△rt−1,obs + βπ0.πt + βπ4.πt+4|t + βy0.yt + βy1.yt+1|t
+βσi.I [i ∈MPCt] .σ
(
yt+1|t
)
+ λ/.Zt−1 + εit, (29)
where I [i ∈MPCt] is the indicator that member i was present at the MPC
meeting on date t, βσi represents the responsiveness of member i’s deci-
sion to uncertainty in future output, and πt+4|t and yt+1|t denote the ex-
pected/ forecasted value for inflation and output. The latent variables △rit
are assigned to intervals in the same way as earlier. However, here there
are occasions when individuals MPC members have voted for a reduction
of 40 or 75 basis points, or an increase of 50 basis points, hence all votes
for change of more than 25 basis points have been assigned to the intervals
[∆rit,obs − 0.125,∆rit,obs + 0.125).
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3.4 Random effects models of base rate changes with
heterogeneity among members
The above fixed effects formulation, however, cannot capture one important
aspect of the heterogeneity in the decision processes of MPC members —
namely, the degree of activism. As noted earlier, some MPC members’ deci-
sions are characterized by a greater degree of variability than some others’20.
A convenient way of modeling the decision processes of MPC members that
captures such features would be through a random effects model; the response
of a more activist member would be characterised by a higher variance of the
effect of σ (yt).
A typical application of random effects in this context would have been
through the model
△rit = α+ βr.△rt−1,obs + βπ0.πt + βπ4.πt+4|t + βy0.yt
+βy1.yt+1|t + λ
/.Zt−1 + uit,
where
uit = βσi.I [i ∈MPCt] .σ
(
yt+1|t
)
+ εit,
βσi ∽ N (µi, σ
2
i ) , εit ∽ N (0, σ
2) , εit and βσi independently distributed.
However, this model is not identifiable. One can only work with this
model if σ2 = 0, which is not satisfactory.
An alternative random effects model is the following:
△rit = α+ βr.△rt−1,obs + βπ0.πt + βπ4.πt+4|t + βy0.yt + βy1.yt+1|t
+λ/.Zt−1 + (β
∗
σ + βσi) .I [i ∈MPCt] .σ
(
yt+1|t
)
,(
β∗σ
βσi
)
∽ N
[(
µ
µi
)
,
(
σ2 σ0i
σ0i σ
2
i
)]
, (30)
0 = nµ+
I∑
i=1
niµi,
βσi’s are independent of each other,
20Buiter and Nickell are prominent examples (Table 1). Both have disagreed from the
consensus interest rate decisions at a substantial number of meetings, but their proposals
have not been predominantly above or below the consensus decision.
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where β∗σ represents the typical response of monetary policy to uncertainty,
βσi is the response of the specific MPC member
21, and n and ni’s are the
total number of meetings, and the number of meetings that member i attends
respectively. Recall the discussion in the previous section regarding the two
sources of heterogeneity. This model allows the segregation of the uncertainty
term into these two parts, one that is common to all members (depending
only on the overall degree of forecast uncertainty), and the other incorporates
individual-specific heterogeneity in the degree of activism.
We have implemented this model by assuming that new MPC members
go with the general flow for a period of time (the first 3 meetings in our
case) before their individual views start getting expressed22. Thus, we can
use the votes of all the MPC members in these three initial meetings to
estimate µ and σ2, and votes in the subsequent meetings to estimate the
individual specific heterogeneity parameters. We further assume that σ (yt)
is uncorrelated with the other regressors23. We first estimate the regression
△rit = α+βr.△rt−1,obs+βπ0.πt+βπ4.πt+4|t+βy0.yt+βy1.yt+1|t+λ
/.Zt−1+uit
(using a heteroscedasticity-consistent estimator) and use the computed resid-
uals to construct ûit/σ
(
yt+1|t
)
24. Finally, we compare the means in an analy-
sis of variance (ANOVA) framework, after taking account of the differences
in variance for different levels of the design variable (in this case, one for
each member and a common effect corresponding to β∗σ). In this way, we can
identify significant contrasts (difference in means) between µ and the µi’s,
21Note that we do not assume independence of β∗σ and βσi, but assume that they are
jointly normally distributed.
22Some recent work (Sibert, 2003, for example) suggest that such an assumption
is justifiable from a theoretical point of view. This assumption also appears to be
justified in the present context of members of the Bank of England MPC. The first
vote against the motion for the 19 MPC members have been in meeting number
(1,1, 2, 4, 4, 5, 8, 8, 8, 9, 9, 9, 9+, 10,18, 19, 20, 23, 74+) (+ denotes censored to the right).
Further, none of the 19 members have proposed an interest rate lower than the consensus
decision within the first 3 meetings.
23This is not an unreasonable assumption; the squared multiple correlation coefficient of
σ
(
yt+1|t
)
on all the other regressors is 0.336 and that on the two expected output variables
is only 0.054, while the correlation coefficient between σ
(
yt+1|t
)
and yt+1|t is only −0.096.
24Since rit and △rit are not directly observable, we use ûit = rit,obs − r̂it as a proxy,
where r̂it is obtained using the estimates from the above regression. This construction of
pseudo residuals, ûit, would be asymptotically valid if the widths of the censoring windows
reduce to zero as n −→∞.
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and between different µi’s, while allowing the variances of the heterogeneity
term to differ across the members.
3.5 A random coefficients model
The random effects model in the previous subsection has the limitation that
the restriction on the magnitudes of the random effect means (µ and µi’s) de-
pends on the design through n and the ni’s. This limitation can be overcome
by considering the following random coefficients model:
△rit = α+ βr.△rt−1,obs + βπ0.πt + βπ4.πt+4|t + βy0.yt + βy1.yt+1|t
+λ/.Zt−1 + βσ,it.I [i ∈MPCt] .σ
(
yt+1|t
)
+ εit, (31)
βσ,it are random coefficients independent of each other and of εit,
βσ,it ∽ N
(
µi, σ
2
i
)
, εit ∽ N
(
0, σ2
)
.
Under the interval regression framework considered earlier, we first esti-
mate the slope-heterogeneity fixed effects model:
△rit = α+ βr.△rt−1,obs + βπ0.πt + βπ4.πt+4|t + βy0.yt + βy1.yt+1|t
+λ/.Zt−1 + βσi.I [i ∈MPCt] .σ
(
yt+1|t
)
+ εit.
Now, if we can estimate the regression residuals, ε̂it, the significance of
differences in means (contrasts) can be tested, using
β̂σ,it =
ε̂it
σ (yt+1)
+ β̂σi
as a pseudo-sample from the distribution of βσ,it. In our application, the
residuals cannot be directly obtained, since the response variable is censored.
However, one can either use ε̂it = rit,obs− r̂it as pseudo-residuals (as earlier),
or bootstrap from the distribution of the εit, and then use this sample to
evaluate the contrasts. This would constitute another way to identify sig-
nificant contrasts between different µi’s, while allowing the variances of the
heterogeneity term to differ across the members.
4 Results
We estimate the fixed effects models (Equations 23 and 29) and the ran-
dom effects model (Equation 30); estimates of the random coefficients model
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(Equation 31) give results similar to the random effects model, and are not
reported here.
4.1 Majority decisions of the MPC
Table 2 presents parameter estimates and goodness-of-fit measures for the
estimated model for majority MPC interest rate decisions. These are the
change in interest rates that are actually implemented. Results using OLS
and interval regression are presented here; the implications of estimates of a
multinomial logit model are similar.
It is clear that expected inflation and expected output matter for the
interest rate decision; currently observed inflation and output play no signif-
icant role. This confirms the assertion of Section 2 that the Bank of England
follows an inflation forecast regime. It is also noticeable that movements
in the stock market and housing market are significant. The coefficients on
unemployment and exchange rate have the right sign but are not significant.
The impact of output uncertainty is negative, but not significant.
TABLE 2: Inflation Targeting Model Estimates,
Majority MPC Interest Rate Decisions (Jun.1997-Dec.2003)
Variables Ordinary Interval
Least Squares Regression
△rt−1,obs -0.074 (0.516) -0.110 (0.288)
πt 0.017 (0.731) 0.022 (0.695)
πt+4|t 0.075 (0.029)
∗ 0.086 (0.026)∗
yt -0.005 (0.902) 0.020 (0.656)
yt+1|t 0.154 (0.001)
∗∗ 0.193 (0.000)∗∗
△ut -0.109 (0.345) -0.075 (0.562)
Phsg,t 1.141 (0.052)
+ 1.306 (0.049)∗
PFTSE,t 0.329 (0.083)
+ 0.641 (0.001)∗∗
Pexch,t 0.005 (0.220) 0.006 (0.153)
σ
(
yt+1|t
)
-0.538 (0.367) -0.525 (0.453)
constant -0.314 (0.611) -0.531 (0.452)
Number of meetings 79 79
Goodness of fit F (10, 68) = 5.33 Wald χ2(10) = 140.65
Prob. > F = 0.0000 Prob. > χ2 = 0.0000
R
2 = 0.5032 Log pseudo-likelihood
RMSE = 0.1249 = −44.8800
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TABLE 3: Model Estimates — Individual MPC Members’ Decisions
Variables Heterogeneity: Heterogeneity: No
Indiv. members Int. vs. Ext. heterogeneity
△rt−1,obs -0.143 (0.000)
∗∗ -0.141 (0.000)∗∗ -0.140 (0.001)∗∗
πt -0.018 (0.431) -0.009 (0.689) -0.009 (0.695)
πt+4|t 0.104 (0.000)
∗∗ 0.099 (0.000)∗∗ 0.099 (0.000)∗∗
yt -0.009 (0.566) -0.017 (0.287) -0.019 (0.244)
yt+1|t 0.220 (0.000)
∗∗ 0.220 (0.000)∗∗ 0.216 (0.000)∗∗
△ut -0.196 (0.000)
∗∗ -0.199 (0.000)∗∗ -0.198 (0.000)∗∗
Phsg,t 1.807 (0.000)
∗∗ 2.062 (0.000)∗∗ 2.055 (0.000)∗∗
PFTSE,t 0.687 (0.000)
∗∗ 0.727 (0.000)∗∗ 0.731 (0.000)∗∗
Pexch,t 0.007 (0.000)
∗∗ 0.006 (0.000)∗∗ 0.006 (0.000)∗∗
σ
(
yt+1|t
)
-0.414 (0.087)+
— × Allsopp -0.343 (0.160)
— × Barker -0.265 (0.284)
— × Bean -0.262 (0.285)
— × Bell -0.319 (0.202)
— × Budd -0.215 (0.377)
— × Buiter -0.288 (0.239)
— × Clementi -0.271 (0.266)
— × George -0.277 (0.256)
— × Goodhart -0.273 (0.262)
— × Julius -0.400 (0.097)+
— × King -0.232 (0.338)
— × Lambert -0.289 (0.276)
— × Large -0.174 (0.484)
— × Lomax -0.229 (0.381)
— × Nickell -0.276 (0.260)
— × Plenderleith -0.284 (0.242)
— × Tucker -0.198 (0.427)
— × Vickers -0.238 (0.324)
— × Wadhwani -0.385 (0.112)
— × INTERNAL -0.386 (0.100)+
— × EXTERNAL -0.453 (0.059)+
constant -0.849 (0.001)∗∗ -0.739 (0.003)∗∗ -0.726 (0.005)∗∗
No. of member-meetings 690 690 690
Goodness of fit: Wald χ2 χ2(28) = 1494.98 χ2(11) = 1237.26 χ2(10) = 1123.24
Prob. > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000
Log pseudo-likelihood −480.6630 −503.4762 −520.2405
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4.2 Decisions of individual members with fixed effects
heterogeneity
Table 3 presents interval regression estimates and goodness-of-fit measures
for the fixed effects model when we use the published interest rate decisions
of individual MPC members (over the period June 1997 to December 2003).
In this case we are exploiting the extra information that is provided by the
published voting records of each of the Committee members. In addition
to a model where the votes of individual MPC members reveal their own
(heterogeneous) types, we also estimate a model where the members belong
to two types, depending on whether they are internal members (from the
Bank of England) or external MPC members25.
The broad conclusions from the model are similar to those for the overall
decisions of the MPC. However, we now find that developments in asset mar-
kets do have a significant role to play in monetary policymaking. The higher
significance of unemployment and asset market indicators may arise from
either differing views among the MPC members or from larger sample size
(since we are modelling individual decisions here). In particular, heterogene-
ity seems to be part of the explanation for the strong effect of unemployment;
the coefficient in the committee decision regression (Table 2) lies outside the
95 per cent confidence interval of the estimate in Table 3.
Though none of the heterogeneity coefficients are individually significant,
they are jointly significant26. The signs of the heterogeneity parameters are
in the direction of our a priori belief.
4.3 Decisions of individual members with random ef-
fects heterogeneity
The fixed effects estimates obtained in the previous subsection were not en-
tirely satisfactory for two reasons. First, none of the estimated heterogeneity
coefficients were significant at the 5 percent level, and second, this setup does
25See also Gerlach-Kristen (2003) for some similar analysis.
26Joint significance of the 19 individual member heterogeneity terms — Likelihood ratio
test (LRT): −2. lnL = 82.236, 19 d.f., p-value 0.000. Joint significance of the INTERNAL
and EXTERNAL heterogeneity terms (LRT): −2. lnL = 36.610, 2 d.f., p-value 0.000.
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not allow us to explore individual specific heterogeneity after controlling for
the “activism” apparent in some MPC members. Further, these two issues
may indeed be related; while the lack of significance may be due to a lower
sample size, we would like to control for the differences in variance in a ran-
dom effects framework to have a closer look at the contrasts (differences in
mean responses)27. Table 4 reports estimates of our random effects model
(estimation sample: June 1997 to December 2003).
TABLE 4: Inflation Targeting Model Estimates,
Individual MPC Members’ Interest Rate Decisions — Random Effects
Variables µ̂+ µ̂i V ar (β
∗
σ + βσi)
Allsopp 0.0263-0.0804∗ 0.1266
Barker 0.0263-0.0185 0.1512
Bean 0.0263+0.0004 0.1145
Bell 0.0263-0.1052 0.1164
Budd 0.0263+0.0204 0.1651
Buiter 0.0263-0.0043 0.2282
Clementi 0.0263+0.0134 0.1558
George 0.0263+0.0006 0.1388
Goodhart 0.0206+0.0173 0.1822
Julius 0.0263-0.1006∗∗ 0.1424
King 0.0263+0.0405 0.1512
Lambert 0.0263-0.0263 0.1526
Large 0.0263+0.0588 0.1365
Lomax 0.0263+0.0703 0.1079
Nickell 0.0263-0.0259 0.1668
Plenderleith 0.0263+0.0097 0.1599
Tucker 0.0263+0.0204 0.1069
Vickers 0.0263+0.0225 0.1600
Wadhwani 0.0263-0.0953∗ 0.1460
1. The estimates do not explicitly assume independence of β∗σ and βσi.
2. Other significant contrasts are: µClementi−µJulius : 0.1140
∗∗, µGeorge−µJulius :
0.1011∗, µGoodhart − µJulius : 0.1179
+, µKing − µAllsopp : 0.1209
∗∗, µKing −
µJulius : 0.1411
∗∗, µKing − µWadhwani : 0.1358
∗∗, and µPlenderleith − µJulius :
0.1102∗.
27This procedure ensures that the differences in individual (mean) effects are not masked
by differences in variance — the so-called Behrens-Fisher problem.
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Figure 3: Interest rate changes, predicted and actual (Based on Table 2)
The estimates capture several of the interesting features of heterogeneity
discussed earlier. There are several significant contrasts, both with respect
to the typical average response of monetary policy µ and between member-
specific average responses (µi’s), and the estimates reflect the expected direc-
tion of these contrasts. The degree of “activism” in any member is reflected
in the estimated variance of β∗σ+βσi. For example, Willem Buiter is the most
activist of all MPC members, but he did not have a particular bias in favour
of lower or higher interest rates on average. By contrast, DeAnne Julius had
a significant bias in favour of lower interest rates along with Christopher All-
sopp and Sushil Wadhwani, but they were not more activist than the average.
Charlie Bean stands out as being both close on average to the actual MPC
decision and about the least activist. Thus, this appears to be a reasonable
model of monetary policy decision-making in the presence of uncertainty.
4.4 Forecast performance of the estimated models
The comparison of actuals and predicted decisions of the MPC, in terms
of level of the base rate and interest rate changes, are shown in Figures 3
and 4 respectively. These predictions are based on estimates in Table 2, ie.,
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Figure 4: Interest rates, predicted and actual (Based on Table 2)
they do not incorporate heterogeneity in the decisions of the individual MPC
members. The final 15 months (January 2004 to March 2005) in each of the
figures are out-of-sample, and represent forecast performance of the models.
Figures 3 and 4 indicate good conformity between the model predictions
and the actual level of the base rate and base rate changes. Figure 4 also indi-
cates indicates a degree of cautiousness in policy, particularly in the later half
of the period under study. To explore whether such policy cautiousness may
be reflected in the heterogeneity of the individual MPC members’ decisions,
we use the model with fixed effects heterogeneity to predict the decisions of
individual members (and consequently consensus decisions of the committee)
for the forecast period. These out-of-sample predictions are summarised in
Tables 5 and 6.
Table 5 presents 2 × 2 contingency tables for the actual and predicted
votes of MPC members for each of the months, January 2004 to March 2005.
The Table for January 2004 can be read as follows. The second column
shows that eight members out of nine voted for no change in January 2004.
Of these eight, the model predicts that five members would have voted for
27
no change and three for an increase. One member voted for an increase in
the base rate: the model predicts this vote correctly.
TABLE 5: Predictions of MPC Members’ Decisions
(January 2004 to March 2005)
Predicted Actual votes Total
votes: No change Raise (pred.)
January 2004
No Change 5 0 5
Raise 3 1 4
Total (actual) 8 1 9
February 2004
No change 0 3 3
Raise 0 6 6
Total (actual) 0 9 9
March 2004
No change 0 0 0
Raise 9 0 9
Total (actual) 9 0 9
April 2004
No change 0 0 0
Raise 8 1 9
Total (actual) 8 1 9
May 2004
No change 0 0 0
Raise 0 9 9
Total (actual) 0 9 9
June 2004
No change 0 0 0
Raise 0 9 9
Total (actual) 0 9 9
July 2004
No change 1 0 1
Raise 8 0 8
Total (actual) 9 0 9
August 2004
No change 0 0 0
Raise 0 9 9
Total (actual) 0 9 9
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TABLE 5 (contd.)
Predicted Actual votes Total
votes: No change Raise (pred.)
September 2004
No change 0 0 0
Raise 9 0 9
Total (actual) 9 0 9
October 2004
No change 7 0 7
Raise 2 0 2
Total (actual) 9 0 9
November 2004
No change 9 0 9
Raise 0 0 0
Total (actual) 9 0 9
December 2004
No change 9 0 9
Raise 0 0 0
Total (actual) 9 0 9
January 2005
No change 9 0 9
Raise 0 0 0
Total (actual) 9 0 9
February 2005
No change 8 1 9
Raise 0 0 0
Total (actual) 8 1 9
March 2005
No change 7 2 9
Raise 0 0 0
Total (actual) 7 2 9
The ‘success’ of the the model may be measured by the total number of
correct predictions, given by the sum of the first two diagonal elements: out
of nine votes the model correctly predicted six. The model predicted the
direction of change in base rates correctly in January, February, May and
June 2004, and for the period October 2004 to March 2005. In March and
April 2004 the model predicted that further increases in interest rates were
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warrented. These increases did not actually materialise until May 2004.
The results are quite reasonable, given that the results pertain to a strictly
non-sample period, and includes a period (March to September 2004) of
consistently strong upward pressure on interest rates. The results can be
summarised (summed up) in the following 2×2 contingency (frequency) table
(also sometimes called a Confusion matrix), where the figures in parentheses
are estimated probabilities of each cell in the matrix (e.g., 52/135 = 0.385).
Let the elements of the matrix (probabilities) be denoted by pij’s, the row
totals by pi.’s, and the column totals by p.j’s.
The combined period contingency table is given by:
Predicted Actual votes Total
votes: No change Raise (pred.)
No change 55(0.407) 6(0.044) 61(0.452)
Raise 39(0.289) 35(0.259) 74(0.548)
Total (actual) 94(0.696) 41(0.304) 135(1.000)
The overall accuracy measure is 0.667(= 90/135) and the odds ratio is
8.226(= 55/6
39/35
). Cohen’s kappa is estimated at κ̂ = 0.358 (standard error
estimate = 0.087), implying that the model avoided 36% of the errors that
a completely random vote assignment would generate. The Pearson’s χ2 is
22.19 and the φ-coefficient is 0.405. These measures reflect a high degree of
predictive power of our fixed effects model.
Table 6 presents predictions for the MPC as a whole using our estimated
fixed and random effects models. Our estimated random effects model in-
corporates heterogeneity among the decisions of MPC members which is
expressed in terms of different probabilities of voting for changes in interest
rates. The decision making process may thus be seen as a binomial exper-
iment with 9 independent draws with a different probability of success for
each draw. The predicted probabilities using the random effects model are
estimated using 1000 Monte Carlo simulations of random draws. The fixed
effects results have been derived from the results in Table 5.
The random effects model predicts that based on information available
in January 2004, the probability of a rise in interest rates was around 0.47.
However, interest rates were not raised. Similarily for February 2004, the
model predicts that given the current economic environment at that time
the probability of a rise would have been 0.42. Interest rates were raised in
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February. In March, April and May 2004 the model predicts with probability
almost 1.00 that interest rates should have been raised. In fact they were
not raised until May 2004. Thus, the models predicts the strong upward
pressure on interest rates in the first half of 2004 reasonably well. Similarly,
the models predict unchanged interest rates over the period October 2004 to
March 2005 very well.
TABLE 6: Predictions of MPC Consensus Decisions
MPC Actual Fixed Effects Random Effects (pred. prob.)
meeting change Model Lower No Raise
month (predicted) −0.25 change 0.25 0.50
Jan. 2004 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.530 0.470 0.000
Feb. 2004 0.25 0.25 0.000 0.579 0.421 0.000
Mar. 2004 0.00 0.25 0.000 0.004 0.746 0.250
Apr. 2004 0.00 0.50 0.000 0.000 0.430 0.570
May 2004 0.25 0.50 0.000 0.000 0.545 0.455
June 2004 0.25 0.50 0.000 0.000 0.371 0.626
July 2004 0.00 0.25 0.000 0.097 0.896 0.007
Aug. 2004 0.25 0.25 0.000 0.144 0.852 0.004
Sep. 2004 0.00 0.25 0.000 0.102 0.890 0.008
Oct. 2004 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.938 0.062 0.000
Nov. 2004 0.00 0.00 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000
Dec. 2004 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.999 0.001 0.000
Jan. 2005 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.997 0.003 0.000
Feb. 2005 0.00 0.00 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000
Mar. 2005 0.00 0.00 0.002 1.000 0.000 0.000
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have considered the conduct of UK monetary policy from
1997. Since then the Bank of England has had operational independence
and decisions on interest rates made by the majority verdict of a Monetary
Policy Committee. An enormous amount of information is provided about
the data made available to the MPC and the decisions on interest rates
decided upon by individual members. We find that an inflation forecast
regime best describes what the MPC does but we also find an important role
for developments in foreign exchange, equity and housing markets, once we
exploit the extra information that is available in the individual voting records
of MPC members. A role can also be found for unemployment. It is an open
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question whether our ability to detect a role for variables other than inflation
and output is due to heterogeneity across the members of the MPC. In other
words individual members may attach some importance to developments in
asset markets and reflect these in an individual decision, which does not get
carried through to the collective decision.
We find evidence of heterogeneity in the way uncertainty about future lev-
els of output and output gap affect the interest rate decisions of individual
MPC members. This heterogeneity is reflected in the majority decisions of
the MPC. Further, information about the voting intentions of MPC members
can be exploited for forecasting. This suggests that transparency and pre-
dictability are best served by the publication of voting records of individual
members.
Our estimated models predict the stance of monetary policy in the Bank
of England fairly well. It has been suggested in the literature that past
monetary policy decisions (and, voting behaviour in past meetings) contain
information about future changes in interest rates (Cobham, 2003; Gerlach-
Kristen, 2004). We have not taken into account committee decision in the
past month but not the voting behaviour of individual members in past
meetings; this seems to affect our predictions somewhat.
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